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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Maxine Dearing was outside a hotel room picking up her friend to take him to a medical
appointment when law enforcement responded to a report that the hotel room smelled of
manJuana. Officers followed Ms. Dearing and her friend, and, upon entering the hotel room,
discovered over 45 pounds of marijuana.

A jury convicted Ms. Dearing of one count of

trafficking in marijuana over 25 pounds and one count of possession of marijuana hash oil. She
received a unified sentence of seven years, with five years fixed, for trafficking and credit for
time served (231 days) for the misdemeanor possession of marijuana hash oil.
Ms. Dearing asserts three errors on appeal. First, she contends the evidence was
insufficient to establish either constructive or actual possession of the marijuana "hash oil" found
in the refrigerator. Second, she asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by lowering
the State's burden of proof when she defined possession by telling the jury that a television in a
house is possessed by everyone in the house; thus, the marijuana in the hotel room was possessed
by everyone inside the room. Due to these errors, Ms. Dearing respectfully requests this Court
vacate the district court's judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial. Finally,
Ms. Dearing also contends that her sentence represents an abuse of the district court's discretion,
as it is excessive given any view of the facts.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contention that Ms. Dearing's
knowledge of the marijuana in the hotel room automatically proves she also possessed a different
substance in the hotel room refrigerator. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-16.) Ms. Dearing also
acknowledges new controlling authority which governs those cases in which an appellant asserts
fundamental error.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m
Ms. Dearing's Appellant's Brie£

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Was there sufficient evidence that Ms. Dearing possessed marijuana hash oil?

II.

Did the State commit misconduct by lowering the State's burden to prove Ms. Dearing
guilty of possession of marijuana?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence? 1

1

Ms. Dearing fully set forth her sentencing issue in her initial Appellant's Brief, and a response
to the State's argument is not necessary.
3

ARGUMENT
I.

The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Ms. Dearing Possessed The Marijuana Hash Oil
At trial, the State failed to present sufficient evidence supporting the jury's finding that
Ms. Dearing had knowledge of, and the power and intent to control, the marijuana hash oil she
was convicted of possessing. See State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 360 (1995) (approving jury
instruction defining "possession" as "a person has possession of something if the person knows
of its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it.") The
State claims that it proved Ms. Dearing possessed the marijuana hash oil because ( 1)
Ms. Dearing had a primary role in marijuana manufacturing in the hotel room and (2) the
marijuana hash oil was part of Ms. Dearing's marijuana manufacturing. (Respondent's Brief,
p.9.) The State's arguments both fail.
The State attempts to portray Ms. Dearing as the mastermind of the entire marijuana
processing operation; however, the facts it identifies which supposedly support this contention
merely establish that Ms. Dearing may have been involved in the marijuana processing, but was
by no means the leader of the gang. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) For example, in support of
its proposition that it was Ms. Dearing's processing operation, the State claims that she signed
paperwork to rent the room, she was holding a cardboard box containing marijuana, she was
evasive when answering police questions, she tried to convince the officers to let she and her
friends leave, a couple of the jars containing marijuana had her name on them, she was the only
woman and a tub holding her belongings contained a mason jar (some of the marijuana was in
mason jars), and there was a sketch of a house which contained "weed storage totes" and which
was located on the same highway as Placerville, California, where Ms. Dearing was from.
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(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) Further, the rental vehicle had been driven approximate the distance
from Boise to Placerville. (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) The State also believes the fact that
Ms. Dearing did not want to say, over the jail telephone, why she was in the hotel room, despite
telling the caller regarding the 50 pounds of marijuana in the room, "if you 're going to do it, do it
right," establishes that she played a primary role in the process. (Respondent's Brief, p.11.)
However, none of the facts the State believes support its argument, even when added together,
establish that Ms. Dearing planned or orchestrated or lead the individuals involved in the
marijuana processing in the hotel room.
The thrust of the State's argument is that because Ms. Dearing played a "key role" in the
processing, and that it presented substantial evidence that the marijuana hash oil was part of
"Dearing's marijuana manufacturing process," therefore, "a reasonable juror could infer that
Dearing knew of the marijuana hash oil found in her hotel room and had the power and intent to
control it." (Respondent's Brief, p.12.)
This theory does not hold water and is based on a hyperbolic version of the testimony at
trial. Detective James Roberson testified as to the process by which hash oil was extracted from
marijuana. (Tr., p.231, L.4 - p.232, L.24.) He did not testify that the marijuana hash oil in the
hotel refrigerator was "part of Ms. Dearing's marijuana manufacturing process."

(Trial

Tr., p.222, L.10 - p.274, L.12; p.292, L.1 - p.323, L.7.) Further, there was no testimony or
evidence put forth by the State that the marijuana hash oil in the refrigerator matched or was
related to the plants found in the room, or that it was prepared in the hotel room.
Tr., p.162, L.1 - p.274, L.12; p.292, L.9 - p.394, L.16.)

(Trial

Detective Roberson testified that

creating the hash oil requires a solvent such as a butane oil or a butane gas (Trial Tr., p.231, L.23
- p.232, L.1 ); however, there was no testimony or evidence that butane was found in the hotel
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room. (Trial Tr., p.162, L.1 - p.274, L.12; p.292, L.9 - p.394, L.16; State's Exhibits 1-65.)
Further, there was no testimony or evidence of the presence of a glass baking dish, another item
used to prepare hash oil (Trial Tr., p.232, Ls.9-17). (Trial Tr., p.162, L.1 - p.274, L.12; p.292,
L.9 - p.394, L.16; State's Exhibits 1-65.)
"[W]here the defendant has nonexclusive possession of the premises where contraband is
found, the state simply needs to present some additional evidence that would support the
inference of possession"-this it did not do.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13 (citing State v.

Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784-85 (Ct. App. 1987)).) The State believes it "presented substantial

evidence of a nexus between Dearing and the marijuana hash oil." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.)
This is incorrect. Hash oil is a different substance. The State posits that, had "the police found a
different substance in the refrigerator," such as heroin, it would be a stretch to say that the jury
could infer that Dearing possessed the heroin. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) However, that is
exactly what is happening here. Knowledge of the large quantity of marijuana in the hotel room
does not automatically prove her possession of a small, opaque shopping bag containing a
different substance in the room refrigerator. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-16.) This argument
fails in light of the facts of Ms. Dearing's case and controlling precedent.
Absent actual possession of the controlled substance, the State must establish
constructive possession by showing the defendant knew of the substance and had the power and
intention to control it. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242 (1999); State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho
635, 638 (Ct. App. 2011).

Constructive possession exists where there is a sufficient nexus

between the defendant and the controlled substance to show the defendant had the power and the
intent to exercise dominion or control over the substance. State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784
(Ct. App. 1987). Constructive possession may be "joint or exclusive." Blake, 133 Idaho at 242.
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A jury may infer knowledge of the substance where a defendant is in control of the premises, but
additional circumstances showing knowledge are necessary when the control is not exclusive.

Id.
While the jury may have concluded that there was evidence that Ms. Dearing had been in the
room where the marijuana was being processed, her physical proximity (to the extent her nearness to
the hash oil in an opaque bag in the closed refrigerator constitutes proximity) does not establish proof
of possession, Garza, 112 Idaho at 784, and neither does her presence in the room, where she is not
exclusively in possession of the premises. Blake, 133 Idaho at 242. Although Ms. Dearing signed
the paperwork to rent the hotel room, there was testimony that Ms. Dearing had driven to the hotel
with Lucas Graham and James Rhoades, and "that they were all in the motel room together."
(Tr., p.220, Ls.6-19.) Indeed, "[w]here joint occupancy is involved, substantial evidence must exist
establishing the guilt of each defendant, not merely the collective guilt of both;" "[p ]roximity alone
will not suffice as proof of possession." Garza, 112 Idaho at 784-85.
Ms. Dearing's case is similar to State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832 (Ct. App. 1986), a case in
which the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated convictions for manufacturing marijuana by a
husband and wife because the State did not present sufficient evidence that either one had
individually exercised control over the marijuana. Id. at 834. Another Court of Appeals case,

State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537 (Ct. App. 1993), involved an underage man being charged with
possession of alcohol after beer was found next to him in the back seat of a car with two other
individuals in the front seats. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that proximity to the beer alone
was not enough, and the State had not presented sufficient evidence that he had control over the
beer so as to establish constructive possession. Id. at 542.
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Because the State presented no evidence Ms. Dearing possessed the hash oil, the State failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Ms. Dearing had actual or constructive possession of the
hash oil in the hotel room refrigerator.

II.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting The Law And The State's Burden
Of Proof
The State claims that the prosecutor's improper remarks were merely taken out of
context, and were not what they appeared to be, which was telling the jury that "knowledge and
the power and intent to control it" was the equivalent of "access to it." (Respondent's Brief,
p.19.) When read in context, the remarks are precisely what Ms. Dearing asserted them to be,
misrepresentations of the law which lowered the State's burden of proof
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that "the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970). "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). Ms. Dearing asserts
that her right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated by the
prosecutor's misrepresentation of the State's burden of proof and the law during voir dire and
closing arguments.
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With respect to the other two prongs of the fundamental error test, the State relies on the
Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Miller, No. 46517, 2019 WL 1217673 (Idaho
Mar. 15, 2019), which was issued after the Appellant's Brief was filed in this case.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.21-22.) Miller changed the fundamental error analysis with respect to
the second and third prongs of the test. Regarding the second prong-the requirement that the
error be clear from the record-the Court wrote, "This means the record must contain evidence
of the error and the record must also contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a
tactical decision in failing to object." Id. at *2. It went on to state, "[W]e clarify that whether
trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object is a claim that must be supported by
evidence in the record." Id.
In this case, the error is certainly clear from the prosecutor's statements. The prosecutor
told the jurors of the location of the marijuana hash oil wrapped in the Walmart bag in the
refrigerator:
It's free game for anyone in that room. But what we're talking about is
knowledge and the power and intent to control it, if anyone has access. It is not
hidden. It is not locked in a safe where only one person has access to it. In the
fridge with their leftovers where anyone has access to it. That is possession.
(Trial Tr., p.466, Ls.3-9.)
In order for the State to establish constructive possession, it was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Ms. Dearing knew of the marijuana and had the power and intention to
control it Blake, 133 Idaho at 242. While a possessory interest in the premises on which the
controlled substances are found has often been used to infer knowledge, when the "defendant is
in non-exclusive possession of the premises upon which drugs were found there can be no
legitimate inference that he knew of the drugs and had control of them in the absence of other
circumstances such as incriminating statements which tend to support such inference." State v.
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Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 754 (1976).

Further, because the record reveals no objectively

reasonable basis not to object to such a blatant distortion and diminution of the State’s burden,
the record shows that trial counsel’s failure to object was not tactical. The State argues that
because “Dearing’s defense at trial was that she was never in the hotel room at all,” her counsel
“could have made the tactical decision not to object to the prosecutor’s argument that ‘anyone in
the room’ had access to the marijuana hash oil” where that the argument would be contradictory
to his theory of the case. (Respondent’s Brief, p.21.) This is absurd. No reasonable attorney
would believe that correcting the prosecutor’s misstatements about the meaning of a crucial
element of the crime could concede that his client was in the room.

Such reasoning is

completely illogical. Defense counsel can maintain that his client was never inside the hotel
room without allowing the prosecutor to lower the State’s burden of proof by telling the jury that
“possession” was the same as “access to it.”
fundamental error test as follows:

Miller also clarified the third prong of the

“the third prong of Perry requires that the defendant

demonstrate that the clear error in the record—i.e., the error identified in the first and second
prongs—actually affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Id. In other words, the error
must be shown not to be harmless.
Here, the prosecutor misstated the meaning of the possession element of the crimes,
thereby reducing the State’s burden of proof; therefore, the error cannot be harmless. In other
words, the prosecutor’s misconduct in misrepresenting the meaning of possession affected the
outcome of the trial because it allowed the jurors to render a verdict absent a finding that the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Dearing possessed marijuana. Indeed, where
the prosecutor clearly told the jury that it only had to show that Ms. Dearing had access to the
contraband, the finding of guilt shows that the error actually affected the outcome of the trial.
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(Trial Tr., p.466, Ls.3-9.) Further, given the dearth of evidence upon which the jury could have
relied to infer that Ms. Dearing had knowledge of, as well as the power and intent to control, the
marijuana hash oil found in the hotel room (see Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9), the guilty verdict
showed that the State's misrepresentation of the meaning of a crucial element of both crimes
affected the outcome of the trial.
The State does not address this evidence. Instead, it claims "the record demonstrates any
error in the prosecutor's description of possession was harmless." (Respondent's Brief, p.22.)
This is not true. The prosecutor talked about the instruction and then misrepresented what it
meant to possess something.

(Trial Tr., p.465, L.16 - p.466, L.9.)

This amounted to

fundamental error, and the State has failed to show that the prosecutor's statements were
harmless.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Dearing respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and
remand her case to the district court for further proceedings. Alternatively, she requests that this
Court reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this !81 day of July, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this pt day of July, 2019, I caused a true and correct copy
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
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Administrative Assistant
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